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Abstract
Background: The impact of reorganisation on health services delivery is a recurring issue in every healthcare system. 
In 2005 Vietnam reorganised the delivery of health services at the district level by splitting preventive, curative, and 
administrative roles. This qualitative study explored how these reforms impacted on the organisation of maternal health 
service delivery at district and commune levels. 
Methods: Forty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted with health staff and managers involved in the 
provision of maternal health services from the commune to the central level within five districts of two Northern 
provinces in Vietnam. The data were analysed thematically. 
Results: The results showed that 10 years after the reforms created three district-level entities, participants reported 
difficulties in management of health services at the district and commune levels in Vietnam. The reforms were largely 
perceived to negatively affect the efficient and effective use of clinical and other resources. At the commune level, the 
reforms are said to have affected the quality of supervision of the communes and their staff and increased the workload 
in community health centres. 
Conclusion: The findings from this study suggest that the current organisation of district health services in Vietnam 
may have had unintended negative consequences.  It also indicates that countries which decide to reform their systems in 
a manner similar to Vietnam need to pay attention to coordination between a multiplicity of agencies at the district level. 
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Implications for policy makers
• The district health reforms in Vietnam caused disconnection between the different functions of the health system, and inefficiencies in terms 
of the costs of developing and maintaining multiple management structures at the district level.
• The division of district health services into three units exacerbated the existing shortages of qualified health workers in some areas.
• If the separation of curative and preventative functions is considered to be desirable, attention needs to be paid to developing governance 
mechanisms that clarify roles and responsibilities and deliver coordination so as to maximise health outcomes.
Implications for the public
This research suggests that fragmentation in Vietnam occurred when reforms to district level governance saw a move from an integrated model 
to a model where functions were disaggregated.  This disaggregation resulted in a lack of coordination between entities at the district level, and 
inefficiencies in terms of the costs (financial and otherwise) of developing and maintaining multiple management structures at the district level. This 
imposed further costs on the commune health centres (CHCs), which have multiple accountability relationships. If the separation of curative and 
preventative functions is considered to be desirable, this research demonstrates that attention needs to be paid to instituting mechanisms that ensure 
clear responsibility and effective coordination. In other words, the responsibilities of each entity must be clearly delineated in policy and be clearly 
understood by those who work within those entities. 
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Abstr ct
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn att ntion to the normative underpin ings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and olicy-makers, concerning the underlyi g n rmative 
premises and g eater openness when it comes to adv cacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is institut d 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘ he political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
   View Video Summary
li i    i  l l l   i i  l  
 li
t  i ti  t  t lt    s i s tis :  
ll  f s i  t  s, liti s   f l l lt
le et s ei , risti  egge , ivi  ge retse *
bstract
In a recent article, orik o s has dra n attention to the nor ative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. e clai  that o s is indirectly sub itting to a liberal conception of politics by fra ing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual orality. ra ing on the theoretical orks of 
hantal ouffe, e introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to o s’ conception. 
sing controversies surrounding edical treat ent of I S patients in developing countries as a case e 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
obilization based on such an articulation.
ey ords: lobal ealth, Liberal Politics, hantal ouffe, onflict, I S, ntiretroviral ( ) 
reat ent 
opyright:  2016 by er an niversity of edical Sciences
itatio : skhei  , ggen , Engebretsen E. Politics and po er in global health: th  c nstituting role of 
conflic s:  o ent on “ avigating bet een stealth dvocacy and unconscious dog atis : the c allenge 
of researching e nor s, politics and po er of glob l health.” Int J ealth Policy nag. 2016;5(2):117–
119. doi:10.15171/ijhp .2015.188
* orrespondence to:
Eivind Engebretsen
E ail: eivind.engebretsen edisin.uio.no
rticle istory:
Received: 5 Septe ber 2015
Accepted: 13 ctober 2015
ePublished: 15 ctober 2015
Institute of ealth and ociety, Faculty of edicine, niversity of slo, slo, or ay
http://ijhp .co
Int J Health Policy anag 2016, 5(2), 117–119 doi 10.15171/ijhp .2015.188
 a rece t c tri ti  t  t e g i g e ate a t t e 
r le f er i  gl al ealt , rik s e asizes 
t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
e i e tifies t ree relate  r le s: (1) a lack f agree e t 
a g gl al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re ises, 
(2) a lack f agree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  p licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlying or ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a vocacy.1
e c e  t e eff rt t  rei state er a  litics i  
gl al ealt  a  agree t at “a rely e irical evi e ce- ase  
a r ac  i  a fic i ,” a  at s c  a vie  risks c veri g  
“t e r l  f litics a  er.” t y c tra ti g t is ficti  
it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive  y crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cer s f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s itti g t  a li eral 
c ce ti  f litics e i licitly criticizes t e tc es 
f.1  li eral vie  f litics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts a  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec ic 
calc lati , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
is ec e  i  s e  e states t at “it is t ssi le t  
isc ss t e litics f gl al ealt  it t isc ssi g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at e ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
a  er res se is t  evel  a  t l gical c ce ti  f 
t e litical, ere “t e litical el gs t  r t l gical 
c iti .”3 cc r i g t  ffe, s ciety is i stit te  
t r g  c flict. “[ ]y ‘t e litical’ I ea  t e i e si  f 
a tag is  ic  I take t  e c stit tive f a  s cieties, 
ile y ‘ litics’ I ea  t e set f ractices a  i stit ti s 
t r g  ic  a  r er is cr ate , rga izi g a  
c existe e i  t e c text f c flict ality r vi  y t e 
litical.”3  iss e r a t ic ee s t  e c teste  t  ec e 
litical, a  s c  a c testati  c cer s lic acti  a  
creates a ‘ e’ a  ‘t ey’ f r  f c llective i e tificati . t 
t e fixati  f s cial relati s is artial a  recari s, si ce 
a tag is  is a  ever rese t ssi ility.  liticize a  iss e 
a  e a le t  ilize s rt, e ee s t  re rese t t e 
rl  i  a c flict al a er “ it  se  ca s it  
ic  e le ca  i e tify.”3 
s ses t e case f “i creasi g i ter ati al ai  s e i g 
 I S treat e t” t  ill strate is i t.1 e fra es t e 
   View Video Su ary
Nguyen et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(7), 593–602594
Background
Ensuring the delivery of health services that are accessible, 
equitable, safe, and responsive to the needs of the population 
is considered the main objective of a health system.1 In the 
global health context, particularly in developing countries, 
strengthening health services has been recognised as a priority 
to meet the basic health needs of populations.2 Improving 
health service delivery is an essential part of strengthening 
health systems and requires context specific adaptions.3 One 
ongoing controversy is the tension between centralised and 
decentralised organisation and management of the health 
system.4-6 Another relates to the balance between vertical and 
horizontal programming and the challenge of integration 
across programs.7 These two issues are frequently inter-related 
and their impact on services, staff and patients depend on 
factors such as the manner of implementation, management 
capability, the extent of organisational, administrative and 
resource changes and the level of preparation of staff for 
change.8
Health sector reforms include a wide range of actions, 
however “Health sector reforms implies more than just any 
improvement in health or healthcare.”9 Over the past few 
decades, health sector reforms in many low- and middle-
income countries have had a profound impact on the financing 
and organization of the health sector. Some countries have 
reported positive outcomes of reforms to the health sector. 
For example, in Kenya health sector reforms were considered 
to a have positive influence on the health system, establishing 
fiscally significant cost recovery with some equity protections 
in a very difficult environment.9 However, in some countries 
reforms have been reported to increase inequalities in access 
and utilization of health services, and/or having reduced public 
expenditure on the health sector.9,10 For example, Argentinian 
healthcare financing reforms have been criticised and has 
been reported as worsening the pre-existing weaknesses of 
the health sector, including its inefficiency.11
Health sector reforms can take many forms. Some reforms 
have been designed to change which organisations or 
institutions deliver types of health services,12 and hence have 
seen the fragmentation of health systems at various levels.10,13 
Fragmentation is defined as “lack of coordination between the 
different levels and settings of care, duplication of services and 
infrastructure, unutilized productive capacity, and healthcare 
provided at the least appropriate location, especially 
hospitals.”13 The literature has indicated that fragmentation 
can lead to difficulties in access to services, delivery of services 
of poor technical quality, irrational and inefficient use of 
resources, unnecessary increases in production costs, and low 
user satisfaction.1,14 For example, the fragmentation of health 
insurance pools in the Chilean health system was reported 
as inefficient and has decreased solidarity between rich and 
poor, sick and healthy, and young and old.15 Fragmentation 
is not only of concern from an equity perspective, but also 
in relation to the efficiency and affordability of the health 
system.10,12 Little is known about the impact of fragmentation 
of health systems on the way that healthcare services at 
the grass root level in Vietnam are organised and operated 
and what lessons can be learnt internationally about the 
consequences of these reforms. Maternity services are 
provided at all levels interdependently across the Vietnamese 
health system and consequently are a good model to examine 
the impact of health service reorganisation. This study aimed 
to answer two questions: (1) How district health reforms have 
influenced the organisation of maternal health services? (2) 
Could governance mechanisms be strengthened to improve 
the organisation of maternal health services delivery?
Emerging economy countries like Vietnam face governance 
challenges in delivering quality and equitable health services.16 
Publicly funded health services in Vietnam are provided at 
4 levels. Primary care is offered through commune health 
centres (CHCs) in each commune (sub-district). Secondary 
hospital services are provided at the district level. Each 
province is divided into approximately 20 districts. Tertiary 
level hospital facilities are provided at the provincial or 
national level. See Figure 1.
Before 2004, District Health Centres were the only entities in 
charge of all health programs and activities within a district. 
Former District Health Centres had curative and preventive 
functions and were responsible for providing healthcare 
within a district. Decrees 171 and 172 issued in 2004,18 which 
were lately replaced by Decrees 13 and 14 and subsequent 
policy circulars in 2008,19-21 provided the basis for a substantial 
reorganisation of district health services in 2005 and 2006. 
When these policies were implemented, new independent 
entities with separate functions (public administration; 
curative; preventative; and family planning) were created. 
The purpose of these reforms was to strengthen capacity in 
respect of each function, improve efficiency, service delivery 
quality, which in turn would improve the health status of the 
population.16 Figure 2 describes the changes in functions and 
responsibilities of district health units.
There was no specific requirement from the government 
for the districts to be reformed. The Decree regulated 
and instructed the reforms, but stated that the Provincial 
People’s Council should consider implementing the reforms 
if they considered them suited to the current context of the 
province. As a result, a number of provinces delayed or did 
not implement the reform process. In those provinces that 
instituted the reforms, depended on conditions in each 
locality, the delivery of health services at the district level was 
organised with a District Health Centre, District Hospital and 
a District Centre for Population and Family Planning.16 Some 
localities have not yet implemented the reforms, maintaining 
the old model of an integrated District Health Centres plus 
the District Hospitals. This led to a situation where there 
are multiple organisational models at the district level in 
different provinces, or even between districts within the same 
province. Vietnam presently has 697 districts of whom 460 
have instituted the reforms and 233 have not, while other 
districts have not yet reported.22
District Health Bureaus are responsible to the District People’s 
Committees and advise the District People’s Committees on 
the management of CHCs and perform designated tasks 
as authorised by the District People’s Committees and the 
Provincial Health Department. However, in some places 
CHCs may be supervised by the District Health Bureau or 
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the District Health Centre. The District People’s Committees 
control the District Health Bureaus in terms of their direction, 
organisational management, payroll, and operations, whereas 
the Provincial Health Department provides technical 
direction, guidance, monitoring, and inspection. 
District Hospitals were split from the former District Health 
Centres and are now under the stewardship and management 
of the Provincial Health Department. District Hospitals 
provide diagnostic and therapeutic (curative) services to the 
local population and serve as the first referral point for CHCs 
within the district. 
The post-reform District Health Centres now have a largely 
preventative focus with responsibility for national health target 
programs including reproductive health programs. District 
Health Centres supervise CHCs for all vertical programs and, 
in many provinces, supervise all CHC staff.
District Centres for Population and Family Planning are 
under the supervision of the provincial Population and Family 
Planning Branch. The Centres are responsible for technical 
tasks associated with family planning, and communication 
and education about population and family planning within 
the district.
CHCs provide comprehensive primary healthcare at the 
commune level. They provide care and treatment for 
common diseases, conduct normal deliveries, promote family 
planning and preventive hygiene and offer health promotion 
programs. The administrative management of the CHCs 
are the responsibility of the District Health Bureaus and the 
Commune People’s Committees, with technical support from 
the District Hospital and the District Health Centre. A CHC 
may serve from 2000-10 000 people, depending on the region 
or levels of deprivation. Village health workers are responsible 
for primary healthcare functions, including healthcare for 
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mothers and children at the village level.23
Methods
This paper reports one part of a broader study that took 
place in 5 rural districts in Bac Giang and Lao Cai. Lao Cai 
is a province in the northern mountainous area of Vietnam, 
located around 320 km northwest of Hanoi. Bac Giang is in the 
northern midlands and mountainous area of Vietnam, being 
situated 50 km to the east of Hanoi. The two provinces were 
chosen based on the indicators of maternal health services 
reported to the Ministry of Health. Lao Cai had relatively low 
performance on the indicators for this output, while Bac Giang 
had much higher indicators, which include the proportion 
of women having at least 3 antenatal check-ups and the 
proportion of women attended by skilled staff. Both provinces 
had generally instituted the district governance reforms, 
although one province did not transfer the responsibility for 
the supervision of CHCs from the District Health Bureau to 
the District Health Centre. The five districts were purposively 
selected as typical rural districts in Northern Vietnam, with 
one province having a significant ethnic population. 
A qualitative approach was used in order to allow an in-depth 
exploration of factors impacting on organisation of maternal 
health services in Vietnam. Participants included health 
workers from the commune and district levels and health 
managers from all four levels of healthcare system in Vietnam. 
These participants were purposively selected because of their 
roles in the provision or management of maternal health 
services.24 At the central and provincial levels, key informants 
were selected based on their responsibilities and functions. 
At the district and commune levels, apart from purposive 
sampling, the approach also involved the “snow ball or chain” 
approach, with the number of interviews determined by the 
point that responses to particular questions are saturated, that 
is, no new information is being added.25 Forty-three semi-
structured interviews were conducted. Table describes the 
characteristics of the participants.
Interview guides were developed and piloted with health staff 
and managers before using them to guide the interview. The 
interviews aimed to explore the transformation process of 
district health system from the old model into the three district 
health entity model, and the roles and functions of district 
health entities in the supervision of CHCs’ performance. The 
findings of these interviews were used to further develop the 
conceptual framework and to guide the development of tools 
in the main study. 
Interviews were conducted in Vietnamese by the lead author 
at the health worker’s or health manager’s place of work in a 
private space. Each interview took approximately 60 minutes. 
All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, checked 
for quality and translated into English. A number of key 
documents were also purposively selected and reviewed. 
All transcripts were uploaded into NVivo 9.026 and single 
coded by the principal researcher. First, the transcripts of 
these interviews were independently scrutinised and coded 
manually. An initial phase of coding on three transcriptions 
of representative respondents for commune, district and 
provincial levels were conducted by the primary researcher 
and research team members, using the preliminary coding 
schedule and also applying grounded theory techniques27 
with quotations servings as units of analysis.24 This approach 
provided a way of synthesising data, developing concepts and 
also testing emergent concepts with additional fieldwork24 and 
helped identify open codes that were not part of the conceptual 
framework. The results of the parallel coding process were 
then compared, validated and agreed in order to form the 
initial code book. This process of developing the initial code 
book also involved revisiting the summaries of field notes28,29 
and the existing literature review, in particular in relation to 
the categories set out in the conceptual framework. Then, the 
final code book of major codes with the definition for each 
of those was developed. Subsequently a consensus coding 
structure reflecting core themes was developed through 
research team discussions.
Throughout this process, coding was reviewed for 
consistency, revised and refined in an effort to link the core 
themes to the research questions.30 The open codes were 
grouped in meaningful patterns or dimensions, thereafter 
creating categories. Categories are subsequently re-organised 
and linked together in order to understand the relationships 
among categories, highlight patterns and clarify interpretation. 
Table. Description of Participants
No. (%)
Gender
Male 16 (37.2)
Female 27 (62.8)
Age
≤30 4 ( 9.3)
31-40 7 (16.3)
41-50 24 (55.8)
>50 8 (18.6)
Work experience (y)
≤10 7 (16.3)
11-20 23 (53.5)
21-30 8 (18.6)
>30 5 (11.6)
Qualification
Secondary 14 (32.6)
University and College 9 (20.9)
Post graduate 20 (46.5)
Level in the health system
Central 2 (4.7 )
Provincial 6 (14.0)
District 26 (60.4)
Commune 9 (20.9)
Type of facility
Commune Health Centre 9 (20.9)
District Hospital 17 (39.5)
District Health Centre 9 (20.9)
Reproductive Health Centre 4 ( 9.3)
District Health Bureau 2 (4.7 )
Provincial Health Department 2 (4.7 )
Total 43
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The whole process of “making sense of data” was linked to the 
literature review.28 The initial findings were written up by the 
principal researcher and shared with research team members. 
The validation and interpretation of data was undertaken 
against the quotes from transcripts. Memos and field notes 
were used to help triangulate interview data.
The policy documents related to district health reforms 
were retrieved and analysed, focusing on the functions, 
responsibilities and coordination between the new entities. 
In addition, reports from provincial health departments and 
district health entities were collected and analysed to provide 
information related to task division and collaboration of 
entities in the organisation of maternal health service delivery.
Results
This research provides evidence of how fragmentation 
in health systems occurred when reforms to district level 
governance saw a move from an integrated model to a model 
where functions were disaggregated. This section will display 
the difficulties perceived by district level respondents in 
collaborating with other units and in the managing of CHCs, 
and by commune level respondents in performing their 
assigned tasks.
District Level
Dilution in Human Resources
In respect of human resource management, the analysis 
identified two key issues: the exacerbation of workforce 
shortages; and lack of management skills. The creation of 
multiple entities at the district level has the potential to 
exacerbate the existing shortages of qualified health workers. 
Each district health entity should have at least one director 
and one or two deputy directors who usually have the highest 
qualifications amongst the health workers in the centre. For 
example, in a Centre for Population and Family Planning, 
there are 6-7 health workers, one of whom acts as the Centre 
director and another health worker who acts as a budget 
officer. The separation of functions at the district health 
level unintentionally appears to have weakened the internal 
capacity of the district health system as it requires many more 
of the better clinically qualified and competent health workers 
to assume management roles. One participant noted: 
“Splitting the former district health centre into different health 
units requires the promotion of many staff to managerial 
positions. The consequence is that we lack people who can 
conduct the clinical work, it is just a waste of resources” 
(District Level, Manager 12).
The district health entities may not have the resources to 
recruit additional clinical staff to fill the clinical roles formerly 
undertaken by managers. As a consequence managers may 
feel pressure to undertake managerial and clinical roles. 
There was also concern expressed about the impact of the 
elevation of health workers to managerial roles without 
training in human resource management. Several district 
managers expressed the view that they were not able to 
evaluate health workers’ performance because they did not 
have human resource management skills. This in turn was 
said to result in loss of job satisfaction, as managers were not 
satisfied with their current management skills and due to their 
management role also could not contribute significantly to the 
clinical areas in which they were trained. It was claimed that 
the district health system gradually had been losing the “good 
clinical performers” in exchange for “ineffective managers.” It 
was also argued that the lack of management skills negatively 
impacted upon health workers under their supervision. 
Lack of Clarity of Responsibilities of District Health Entities 
While the structure of the system in Lao Cai province 
suggests that the District Health Bureaus are responsible for 
the supervision of the personnel and administrative processes 
of the CHCs, the District Health Centre has technical 
supervision of CHCs in respect of implementing target 
programs and maternal health programs, and the District 
Hospital supervises CHCs in diagnostic and therapeutic 
services, in practice the actual responsibilities of these entities 
are less clear. 
The District Health Bureau’s role in both study locations was 
differently understood by respondents. Respondents working 
in the District Health Bureau in both provinces thought that 
their function at a district level was similar to the function 
of the Provincial Health Department at the provincial level, 
which is to manage all health-related activities in the area.
“The District Health Bureau, if understood correctly, is the 
unit that manages all health activities in the district, not only 
CHCs. But we do not have enough personnel and budget 
so our voice is not appreciated. This is really a problem in 
health sector” (District level, Manager 2).
By contrast, other participants from the District Hospitals 
and District Health Centres viewed District Health Bureaus 
as administrative units that do not implement any specific 
health programs, and that its main function is to assist the 
District People’s Committees and manage private medical 
practice within the district:
“...they [District Health Bureaus] are only one department 
under the District Peoples Committee with function to 
provide advice to health issues in the district. However, they 
overplay their role, so it sometimes is very bad” (District 
level, Manager 12).
More importantly, the District Hospital and District Health 
Centre managers considered their organisation to be 
responsible for direct implementation of a program, not the 
District Health Bureau. There seemed to be a disagreement 
as to the supervisory responsibilities of district health entities 
that reportedly caused delays in many processes at the CHC. 
The District Health Bureaus, District Hospitals, and District 
Health Centres all had a role in supervision of CHCs but the 
parameters of their responsibility were unclear, resulting in 
inconsistencies and ineffective or inefficient supervision. 
The leading and supporting roles in curative care of the 
District Hospital towards the CHCs has declined, because 
the CHCs are directly under the management of the District 
Health Centre.16 For example, the District Hospital may 
have the responsibility to supervise CHCs in respect of 
treatment and examination, but in practice they supervised 
the assistant doctors or medical doctors who performed 
some examinations in CHCs. The District Hospital did not 
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supervise the midwife who performs deliveries, as maternal 
health is considered a preventative service and is supervised 
by the District Health Centre. 
The District Health Centre, with its primary responsibility 
being to implement preventive programmes, usually does 
not have much capacity to provide professional mentoring 
and supervision of curative care activities of the CHCs, an 
important part of primary healthcare. There was common 
consensus among respondents that with limited competencies, 
many health workers in District Health Centre’s are not able 
to direct CHCs in the maternal health area.
“Our health workforce do not have obstetrics expertise so 
they need some short training courses on reproductive health 
area, however it is not as good as those have obstetrics 
expertise. Therefore we have problem in supervision. They 
are at district level and responsible to direct CHCs. If they 
have expertise, the technical supervision for CHCs must be 
better” (Provincial level, Administrator 3).
Lack of Collaborative Mechanisms Among Three District 
Health Entities
A common theme emerging from the interviews was the 
poor information transmission processes between entities, 
described by one participant as a “zigzag line” which requires 
a considerable amount of time to navigate. 
“I think that the point is the organisational structure and 
management mechanisms. In the past only one district 
health centre was in charge of both curative and preventive 
functions, including development of vertical programs, 
reproductive health services and population programs. 
The additional function was to advise the District People’s 
Committee on delivering health administration. In short, 
the Provincial Health Department or any other provincial 
bodies, any departments of the District Peoples Committees 
worked only with leaders of district health centres. Now if 
you want to undertake some work, you have to go through a 
zigzag line. It depends what responsibility belongs to which 
unit, hospital or district health centre, or health bureau or 
centre for family planning and population. Oh, it’s very time 
consuming, but that still does not take disunity into account” 
(District level, Manager 13).
Since the separation of responsibilities in 2004, the District 
Health Bureau reports to the District People’s Committee, 
while the District Hospital and the District Health Centre are 
supervised by the Provincial Health Department. For some 
services, all three draw on the same CHC resources and CHCs 
report to the District Health Bureau. This means the District 
Hospital and the District Health Centre need to negotiate 
first with the District Health Bureau, and then approval must 
be sought from the District People’s Committee before the 
District Hospital and the District Health Centre can implement 
programs at CHCs. It was reported by participants that prior 
to the reforms all health-related activities were managed by 
the then District Health Centre and the Centre was proactive 
in cooperating with other health facilities within the district 
and the District People’s Committee. As a consequence, the 
health sector was able to mobilise more resources, and health-
related activities were developed in a timely and effective way. 
The pre-reform District Health Centre had the flexibility to 
deploy and rotate health workers within the Centre in order 
to implement any program, particularly in an emergency or in 
respect of epidemic prevention.
After the reforms, the unclear responsibilities of the District 
Health Bureau, coupled with a lack of effective cooperation 
between entities, have reportedly led to inconsistencies 
between the different entities in program implementation. 
“The District Hospital considers that the District Health 
Bureau is not so important, so sometimes they do not discuss 
with us about the activities to be implemented at CHCs such 
as examination and treatment, drug and medical equipment 
supplies. They just go directly to CHCs to run their programs. 
When we received the report, all of the activities have already 
been developed” (District level, Manager 2). 
Ill-defined responsibilities, divided loyalties and a lack of 
clear cooperation mechanisms were reported to result in 
dysfunctional joint meetings. With three district health 
entities considered to have equal power, collaboration was 
thought to be affected by the unit leaders’ attitudes. 
“The regulation on collaboration may exist, but if they are not 
unified and collaborative, he [a leader of one district health 
unit] can refuse my invitation to the meeting because I am 
not his boss. But if the chair of District Peoples Committee or 
leader of Provincial Health Department calls the meeting, I 
obviously have to go” (District level, Manager 13). 
Participants argued that there needed to be strict regulation to 
force district health entities to collaborate effectively.
“If each of them considers themselves powerful, it is very 
difficult to work together” (District level, Manager 13).
The next section will discuss the impact of the poor 
coordination among district health entities (District Health 
Bureau, District Hospital and District Health Centre) on 
oversight of the CHCs.
Commune Level
The creation of the independent district health entities in 
2005 in the study provinces was said to have had an impact on 
the operations of the CHCs. Many commune health workers 
(CHWs) complained about having too many “supervisors.” 
While CHCs were technically supervised by the District 
Health Centres (for national target programs), by the District 
Centre of Family Planning and Population, and the District 
Hospital (for curative services), they also had to report to the 
District Health Bureau and the Commune People’s Committee 
that recruits and pays staff. No sooner than Circular 03 had 
been issued in 2008, CHCs were transferred to District Health 
Centres in Bac Giang in 2009, and in Lao Cai in 2012.
Participants in this study suggested that the district health 
reforms had shortcomings that resulted in asynchronous, 
ineffective and inconsistent management of CHCs. A district 
manager talked about the current organisation of district 
health in her province.
“The fact is that our system is not good. Our current 
management is disconnected and inconsistent. I think 
health activities should be centralised, that it needs to have 
a centralised direction. In the district there are too many 
district health entities that all supervise CHCs, which can 
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lead to desultory command. That is inconsistent” (District 
level, Manager 2).
In these provinces, while CHCs are supervised by the District 
Health Boards, the fact that the District Health Centres and 
District Hospitals assign tasks for CHCs, but are not the 
entities that pay salaries and do not have a voice in personnel 
decisions, was seen as problematic. It was considered difficult 
to assign workloads and manage the performance of CHWs. 
“Talking about the management system, I see some problems. 
The District Health Bureau is in charge of the personnel in 
CHCs, but the District Health Centre and District Hospital 
supervise them technically. One person pays the salary and 
others assign tasks; things are not synchronous. For example, 
I force you to do many things but I do not pay you, it 
sounds difficult in management practice” (Provincial level, 
Adminstrator 5).
Participants from the District Hospital reported that it was 
relatively difficult to implement technical direction in CHCs. 
District Hospitals have less power over doctors in the CHCs 
(who work through a contract, with the permission of the 
District Health Centre or the District Health Bureau) and they 
rarely provide professional support for CHWs because they 
do not manage personnel. A manager of a District Hospital 
expressed their concern about the accountability of CHCs to 
the District Hospital:
“The situation is like two or three nooses put on one head of 
the CHC. One person pushes them to work, and the other 
pays the salary. Our hospital is responsible for the provision 
of the budget for examination and treatment and drugs but 
in fact we do not manage them. So if some mistakes or losses 
happen, we find it difficult to deal with. This is an economic 
issue. The second one is a technical issue. CHWs are under 
the management of the District Health Bureau and we 
only provide them technical supervision” (District level, 
Manager 12).
Similarly, while the District Health Centre in Lao Cai 
is responsible for the management, mentoring and 
implementation of national target programs, it was not 
directly responsible for managing CHCs. Any program it 
developed needed to get approval from the District Health 
Bureau. 
It is difficult for District Hospitals to effectively provide 
support to the CHC level and District Health Centres also 
face difficulties in mobilizing medical doctors in prevention 
programs. The functioning of the CHCs therefore depended 
heavily on the administrative and managerial collaboration 
between of all these district level entities. Participants 
complained about this situation: 
“If we are talking about adequacy, it is not. We [CHC] 
are under the different supervisions, technically and 
administratively. So we imagine it as having 3 nooses on our 
head. It is very complex” (Commune level, Manager 2).
“No one likes to have many fathers coming to you with a 
stick and admonishing you at the same time. If all fathers 
collaborate well, the children living underneath are less 
miserable. I think having only one person supervising you 
and taking care of you is much better that having many 
supervisors. But we are afraid that in our situation, many 
people give direction but none of them can take care of us. 
Every man for himself. Only the CHC is left” (Commune 
level, Manager 4).
In some cases, CHCs did not know how to respond since 
each “boss” had a different direction and “the bosses rarely 
sit together.” One participant noted that the inconsistency of 
instruction and work direction created difficulties for CHCs. 
“Each person that comes to inspect has their own instructions. 
This person instructs us to do one thing, the other may 
instruct us to do some other thing, and then we have to 
redo things. In general, it would be better if they could work 
together closely” (Commune level, Manager 4). 
Inconsistent instruction from district health supervisors led to 
CHWs being confused or, in some circumstances, mistrusting 
those who supervised their facility. This may result in CHWs 
having “low responsiveness” as part of a coping strategy to 
avoid redoing work. 
It was also reported by district level participants that 
ineffective collaboration amongst district health entities often 
led to programs being sequenced at the same time and this 
was considered to create difficulties for CHCs in terms of 
workflow. For example, a family health planning program and 
an extended vaccination program may take place on the same 
day in CHCs.
“Having too many bosses at the same time” and complicated 
reporting systems due to ineffective collaboration between 
district health entities were issues repeatedly raised by 
commune level participants. The district health entities 
established a multiplicity of reporting requirements. It was 
commonly agreed that this paperwork contributed to the 
workload that CHCs had to shoulder despite being short-
staffed.
“We have to submit many kinds of reports. If the District 
Health Centre collaborates well with the District Health 
Bureau, CHCs do not have to send reports to the District 
Health Bureau. Monthly we have to submit reports to the 
District Health Bureau on personnel, medicine use and 
some other vertical programs. We have to report about 
examination and treatment for insured patients to the 
hospital, vertical programs to the District Health Centre, 
some state administration programs to the District Health 
Bureau, and about population and family planning 
programs to the Centre of Family Planning and Population. 
The regular operation needs to report to the Commune 
People’s Committee. At the same time, we have to make 
many reports” (Commune level, Manager 4).
In addition to reporting to the District Health Bureau, the 
District Hospitals and the District Health Centres, CHCs 
also had considerable paper work for health insurance 
payment procedures. Writing reports was considered to take 
up a large proportion of the working hours of CHWs. Some 
respondents emphasised that there were dozens of reports, 
including weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual reports 
that they needed to submit to three district health entities 
and other bodies. This definitely reduced the time they could 
spend on clinical work and therefore influenced their job 
performance. 
In many districts, CHCs only submitted specific reports 
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relevant to each supervisor, not a report about the whole 
operation of CHCs. For example, CHCs reported only 
examination and treatment activities to the District Hospital, 
and the implementation of vertical programs to the District 
Health Centre. Therefore, the three supervisors would not 
grasp the whole operation of CHCs if they did not collaborate 
closely.
Discussion
This study has shown that while the reforms were premised 
on the belief that there would be gains associated with the 
separation of functions, the changes have also resulted in a 
range of dysfunctionalities that negatively impact on the 
effective governance of district and commune level health 
services. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
In summary, the three district health entities operate 
independently, each focusing on different but overlapping 
issues. There was a clear gap in the management of maternal 
health service delivery, particularly the quality of supervision 
of maternal health services delivery provided at the CHCs. 
The management of health services delivery at the CHCs 
requires integration between the administrative and technical 
management as well as direction in the curative and preventive 
medicine areas. 
Although each country’s reform process has its own 
specificity, there are common trends to achieve national 
health goals and objectives, such as the pursuit of better 
health outcomes in terms of quantity and quality of services, 
and more efficient use of resources. Particularly in the health 
sector, these objectives are commonly expressed in terms 
of improving equity of access to services, effectiveness of 
care, efficient utilization of resources, satisfaction of users, 
and sustainability.31 The health sector reforms which have 
been put in place in many countries have typically involved 
decentralization,32 privatization,12 managerialism, separation 
of entities (insurers and providers),10 and the separation of 
curative and preventive services.33
This research suggests that fragmentation in the Vietnamese 
health system occurred when reforms to district level 
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governance saw a move from an integrated model to a model 
where functions were disaggregated. This disaggregation 
resulted in a lack of coordination between entities at the 
district level, inefficiencies in terms of the costs (financial and 
other) of developing and maintaining multiple management 
structures at the district level10 and consequences for the 
management and service delivery responsibilities of the 
CHCs which post-reform have multiple accountability 
relationships.34 These findings are consistent with earlier 
reports from Vietnam that noted that the division of district 
health services into three units caused disconnection between 
the different functions of the health system and caused 
confusion within CHCs.16,35
The World Health Organization (WHO) noted that 
fragmentation can cause negative consequences for the 
efficiency of the system as a whole.36 Previous studies have 
identified that the separation of vertical programs, such as 
Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDs prevention, and childhood illness,37 
has led to fragmentation. Previous research has also noted that 
the separation of curative and preventative health programs 
may impact the coordination of primary care in developing 
countries.37 A systematic review of decentralization of health 
systems in low and middle income countries indicated that 
some countries experienced coordination problems between 
central and local levels.32,37 The negative consequences of 
fragmentation can include fiscal inefficiencies associated with 
additional costs of management but also the costs associated 
with poor coordination of activities. Previous research has 
noted that “fragmentation by itself or in conjunction with 
other factors can lead to difficulties in access to services, 
delivery of services of poor technical quality, irrational 
and inefficient use of resources, unnecessary increases in 
production costs, and low user satisfaction.”13 Participants 
in this research expressed concerns about resource use, and 
service delivery.
The impact of this fragmentation was particularly problematic 
in respect of the effective operating of CHCs, which provide 
primary healthcare at a local level, as the operational guidance 
and supervision was reported to be somewhat loose and 
accountabilities were unclear. This was said to have led to a 
reduction in operational efficiency of CHCs. The lack of clarity 
in respect of supervision raised operational problems about 
what directives to follow and when. Accordingly, CHWs may 
not be appropriately supervised in all areas of their practice 
and made it more likely that some issues critical to the delivery 
of quality of care may not be adequately supervised. This result 
mirrors the findings from research conducted in Cambodia.38 
Fragmentation at the district level also resulted in multiple 
layers of approval processes and multiple accountability 
requirements leading to a significant burden being imposed 
upon CHCs in terms of reporting and documentation 
requirements. This result mirrors results in previous desk 
review articles from developing countries.39 These unclear 
accountabilities may have contributed to fragmentation of the 
understanding of what was needed for truly integrated care 
provision at the local level, as in some cases no one entity at 
the district level could see the whole picture in terms of the 
CHCs operations. That several participants used the imagery 
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of a hangman’s noose to describe how they felt about the 
supervision they received from the district level entities and 
the apparent lack of coordination says much about the impact 
of this fragmentation of supervision on the morale of CHWs 
and their level of trust in the governance framework within 
which they operated. 
It is evident that the Vietnamese reforms have had an impact 
on the health workforce. The creation and maintenance of 
three entities at the district level was reported as an inefficient 
use of human and other resources, as managers for each entity 
were required. The managers of these entities came from 
senior clinical staff and this had the effect of either limiting 
the time those persons could spend on clinical care or 
requiring them to work effectively two jobs in a rural context 
where it was already difficult to recruit and retain staff.40 
Additionally, these managers did not have the management 
expertise to effectively manage their staff which in turn lead 
to criticism by staff of their lack of management background 
and skills.23 Recent research in Vietnam showed that, poor 
supervision from managers was perceived as demotivating for 
health workers in rural areas.41 This situation is not restricted 
to Vietnam. In general in developing countries, local level 
health managers are often found to lack managerial skills,4,33,42 
but this may be exacerbated in Vietnam given the design of 
the district health system. Moreover, the transfer of personnel 
administration and budget has negatively influenced the 
working conditions and motivation of health workers which 
has also been seen in previous research in other countries.31
Limitations
The study provinces and districts were purposively not 
randomly sampled for practical and resource reasons. We 
believe this sample provides insights into what is happening 
across Vietnam. However, as demonstrated there is 
considerably variability in the implementation of the reforms 
so results may not be generalizable to all provinces.
Conclusion
Internationally, there has been a movement towards the 
development of integrated systems at local levels to enable 
the provision of carefully coordinated and comprehensive 
primary care services to improve health outcomes.13,14,37,43,44 
This research indicates some of the problems from a 
governance perspective when services at the district level are 
not integrated and the unintended consequences that health 
system reforms can have on the provision of clinical services.
The quality of maternal healthcare is influenced by the 
structure and informal practices of the health system within 
which such services are offered.45 This analysis raises questions 
about the efficiency and overall utility of the separation of 
administrative, curative, preventative and family planning 
related functions at the district health level as implemented 
in Vietnam. If such separation of curative and preventative 
functions is considered desirable, reformers also need to 
devote attention to developing governance mechanisms 
that clarify the responsibilities of each entity. These must 
be clearly delineated in policy and be clearly understood by 
those who work within those entities and by the organisations 
and individuals that those entities supervise. The requirement 
for effective coordination must also be clearly delineated. 
Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that such 
coordination occurs so as to maximise health outcomes, 
to, as much as possible, assure efficiencies both in terms of 
operations and costs and to lessen confusion and uncertainty 
experienced by health workers.
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